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1 Critical Thinking About “Critical Thinking”
Bowell & Kemp is a background text for the DERIDASC study. The text argues for
the reconstruction of textual arguments into a logical form for further analysis. The
approach involves the reverse engineering of the premises, the final conclusion, and
any intermediate conclusions of the argument into a format similar to that found in
formal proofs: numbered premises lead to numbered conclusions.
Arguments are assessed according to three criteria: the first is deductively validity,
that is, the requirement that if the premises were true, the conclusion would
necessarily follow from the laws of logic; the second criteria is deductive soundness,
that is, whether the premises really are true. However, since it is not possible to
determine soundness if some premises are probable statements. “Critical Thinking”
assesses these arguments according to the criterion of inductive force, that is, whether
the conclusion remains probable given the probability of the premises (probability is
defined as a better than 50% chance in favour). The inductive force model is
applicable to safety arguments that involve uncertainties, although detailed
quantification of “probability” is required in safety arguments.
“Critical Thinking” is of interest to DERIDASC because argument reconstruction is a
possible step on the road to argument deconstruction. In practice, if an argument is
patently invalid or unsound, there may be no need for deconstructive analyses.
However, in order to demonstrate the relevance of deconstructive thought to
argumentation, we use the text of “Critical Thinking” itself to show that fixed
meanings for the words used in any argument is a necessary presupposition of logical
reconstruction, and that this assumption is problematic.
In this section we provide a “close reading” of some problematic passages in “Critical
Thinking” itself. The text contains some passages where readers can discern a certain
authorial anxiety and conflicts of possible meanings. Deconstruction proposes that
such anxieties and conflicts can be found even those texts that appear clear,
straightforward, well-structured, and coherent on a first reading. The passages studied
offer us the opportunity to demonstrate a typically deconstructive gesture: namely,
that of sympathising with and problematising a text in a single movement. The
examples help to explain why conventional rational analyses may usefully be
supplemented by deconstructive reading strategies. The goals of such reading
strategies are to tease out signs of authorial anxiety, find implicit indications of
uncertainty and contradiction, debunk attempts to gloss over fundamental
complexities, and point out signs of confusion in a text. In other words, a
deconstruction tests the claim of a text to provide direct access to reality and truth.
Before proceeding we need to establish what we shall call here the “claim to
significance” of “Critical Thinking”. This is made fairly explicit in a passage on page
122. The text is arguing against the fallacy of rejecting an argument merely because
the recommended course of action would benefit the party making the argument. It
views this fallacy as an implicit premise of many ordinary everyday arguments:
“ P3) Whenever someone would benefit from something, we should reject their
arguments in favour of it.”
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The text comments:
“Note that P3 is really quite ludicrous: If it were true, then one could never hope to
argue successfully for what one wants! Normally that is exactly what we do, and there
is nothing intrinsically illegitimate about it. So it is unreasonable to reject an
argument because the arguer desires or would benefit from the truth of the
conclusion. What matters is the strength of the reasons given for the claim,
irrespective of the arguer’s motives for making the claim. Reason places no strictures
on arguing in favour of things from which one would benefit.”
In this passage, our interpretation will depend heavily on how we interpret the phrase
“argue successfully for what one wants”. For example, does this mean to get what one
wants whether one’s argument is sound or not, or does it mean to get what one wants
solely by means of a sound argument? In later chapter it becomes clear that “Critical
Thinking” proposes the latter (p. 211):
“To say that someone is ‘mistaken’ could mean either (i) that they have accepted a
false conclusion (ii) that they have been persuaded by bad reasons – by an argument
which is not in fact rationally persuasive for them (or have failed to be persuaded by
good reasons – by an argument that is rationally persuasive for them). Clearly, we
are responsible for our mistakes of type (ii); we ought to be persuaded by good
reasons, and not by bad reasons. If we fail in this, then, typically, we are
blameworthy.”
This straightforward idealism is tempered however. Throughout the text the
importance of applying the Principle of Charity during argument reconstruction is
stressed (p. 45- 46):
“And it may happen that one reconstruction represents the argument as a good one,
another as a bad one. In such a case, which reconstruction should you prefer? Which
should you advance as the reconstruction of the argument?
It depends upon your purpose. If you are hoping to convince others that the person is
wrong, you are most likely to succeed if you represent it as a bad one. Indeed this is a
very common ploy …
… However, if what matters to you is whether or not the conclusion of the person’s
argument is true, then you should choose the best representation of the argument …
… That way, we discover reasons for accepting or rejecting particular propositions,
advancing the cause of knowledge.”
The text also notes a certain difficulty with this approach to advancing the cause of
knowledge:
“The Principle of Charity, however, has a certain limit, beyond which the nature of
what we are doing changes somewhat: If our task is to reconstruct the argument
actually intended by the person, then we must not go beyond what, based upon the
evidence available to us, we may reasonably expect the arguer to have had in mind.
DERIDASC 1 3 24/05/2002
Once we go beyond this point then we are no longer in the business of interpreting
their argument. Instead we have become the arguer.
If our concern is with how well a particular person has argued, then we should not
overstep this boundary. However, if our concern is simply with the truth of the matter
in question, then to overstep this boundary is perfectly all right.”
Thus the Principle of Charity seems to serve several purposes. Firstly, it can be used
to assess how well someone has argued “based upon the evidence available to us”;
thus slips of the tongue and malapropisms might be removed silently; it is used in the
reconstruction what was “really meant”; but one can even “become the arguer” in
order to discover the truth of an issue only raised, but not demonstrated, by the
original argument. The text seems to consider this too as an application of the
principle.
One could argue however, that the Principle of Charity cannot be used to assess how
well someone has argued. Firstly, the necessity of its application reveals that the
original argument was flawed in some way. Secondly, its application might backfire
due to flaws in the hearers understanding of the argument made, or gaps in “the
evidence available”. Thirdly, what has been said and what was really meant by the
arguer might not be related in a simple way. Deconstructive thinkers question the
assumption that a “univocal” (self-contained and coherent) intentionality lies behind
human utterances, and that intentions can be transmitted through the medium of
language without alteration (as is assumed in much of speech-act theory).
Deconstruction proposes that misunderstanding in communication is, in the final
analysis, irreducible.
Their formulation of the Principle of Charity seems to indicate that the authors of
“Critical Thinking” are aware of the problems of fixing meanings to some extent: but
the text is not explicit about how deductively sound arguments help to overcome
those problems. It is notable that since the argument reconstructions demonstrated in
the book are all written in natural language, one can often unsettle them by attacking
the precise meanings of individual words. A problem for our text is that for the truth
of the premises to be verified without misunderstanding, problems of meaning must
be eliminated first. In other words, the argument reconstruction approach in “Critical
Thinking” depends upon the assumption that problems of conflicting meaning either
do not exist, or can be overcome somehow. The authors need not have made such a
strong assumption. A different definition of the Principle of Charity is given in a
similar book by Fisher (1988, p. 18): “… if interpreting as reasoning a passage which
is not obviously reasoning yields only bad arguments, assume it is not reasoning.”
This definition has it’s own problems: for example, an ambiguous passage could
conceivably yield more than one good argument; but we could interpret this definition
as implying that one should not try to overcome ambiguity and vagueness according
to insecure notions about the arguer’s apparent intentions.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the authors of “Critical Thinking” idealise a process in
which one wins a decision in one’s favour only by means of sound argumentation, not
by unsound argumentation and mere rhetoric. Implicitly, the text suggests that getting
ones way by means of an unsound or a meaningless argument is immoral. This ideal
is what the text calls a “prescriptive” principle, that is, an assertion that we ought to
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win arguments by sound argumentation and not by unsound argumentation. As
pointed out on page 113 of the text, the philosopher David Hume argued that an
“ought” (a prescriptive statement) can never be derived from an “is” (a descriptive
statement). Thus our text bases its claim to significance on a prescriptive principle.
This is inevitable. The claim to significance of any text is a prescriptive one: a text
claims that certain problems are worth discussion and explication, either implicitly or
explicitly.
The necessity of a foundation upon prescription is the phenomena that leaves a text
open to deconstruction. Prescriptive claims cannot be proved true or false using logic;
even a self-contradictory prescriptive statement can only be “false” in an informal
sense, as logic has nothing whatsoever to say about statements about what “ought”
and “ought not” to be the case. However, if prescriptive statements cannot be proved
true or false with logic, at least their undecidable nature can be revealed and
problematised, in what we might characterise as a double movement of acceptance
and rejection. This is the purpose of a deconstruction.
For example, the idea that one “ought” to win arguments only by sound
argumentation is easily rendered problematic with a little imaginative thought.
Suppose that a supplier gains safety acceptance for a system by means of a safety
argument that they think is perfectly sound. The argument is officially accepted by the
relevant regulator, who issues a certificate stating that they understand the argument,
and themselves find it sound. The problem for the supplier is to be absolutely sure that
they have communicated their argument properly. This is hard to verify and requires a
measure of trust. How would one verify firstly, that an understanding of one’s safety
argument is actually the cause of the certification, and secondly, that the
understanding reached is identical to one’s own understanding? Indeed, how complete
is the suppliers own “understanding” of their argument? And how much of the
suppliers effort would the all these verification tasks be worth?
Perhaps the regulator has entirely misunderstood the safety argument, thinking all the
while that its own misinterpretation is a sound safety argument. Although it is
improbable, the misinterpretation could itself be a sound argument. These scenarios of
misunderstanding are not logically impossible even where there are numerous face-to-
face discussions; to attain absolute agreement one would have to verify that supplier
and regulator meant exactly the same thing by every word used at every point that it
was used. Therefore, a generalised, imperfect, and inherently fragile form of
agreement is all that is possible in practice: complex agreements, where no single
individual either knows or can simultaneously grasp all the facts, are likely to be a
matter of degree, and always, to an unknown extent, incomplete. Furthermore, one
can imagine highly unlikely scenarios if one presupposes an absence of mutual trust:
perhaps the regulator has reasons for accepting the system that have nothing at all to
do with the argument; for example, the regulator privately knows that the argument is
unsound, but intends to put the supplier out of business by allowing them to field an
unsafe system in revenge for previous disagreements. This is an absurd and fictional
scenario, but it begins to demarcate logical limits on the claim to significance of our
text.
“Critical Thinking” is based on the assumption that in principle the intentions of an
arguer can be discerned behind the argument they make. And yet it also attempts to
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provide a means of reconstructing arguments so that they can be assessed for
properties that are independent of intention. This is a difficult balance to maintain.
The text contains various passages that try to settle arguments using techniques that it
also proposes as fallacies. In the following, we will examine one of them.
On pages 162 – 165, the text reconstructs an argument that Australian school-children
should not be forced by rule to wear sunhats after 11.00 a.m. The reconstruction
introduces an unspoken premise called (P2) that the text states is needed to make the
original argument deductively valid:
“P1) A sunhat rule at school would infringe upon the freedom of the individual.
P2) No rule which infringes upon the freedom of the individual is acceptable
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C) A sunhat rule at school is unacceptable
Here is a deductively valid argument. If the premises are true, then certainly the
conclusion is true. However, this does not establish that the conclusion is true. For
that, we have to ask whether the premises are true – whether the argument is not only
deductively valid but deductively sound.”
The text now argues that the assumption it has introduced, allegedly according to the
Principle of Charity, is absurd:
“Surely, P1 is true, in a sense: By definition, a rule of any kind restricts, hence
infringes upon, the personal freedom of those to whom that rule applies. So let us
grant that P1 is true. But look at P2. We often hear this sort of statement, and we are
often so impressed by such a phrase as ‘the freedom of the individual’ that we accept
the statement as true. We have the feeling that ‘the freedom of the individual’ is
something important and valuable, therefore that anything which takes it away must
be a bad thing. But as stated here, this proposition is absurd.”
Notice that the author is not able to say that P2 is false, only that it is “absurd” and
absurd “as stated here”. The text gives us a reason for this absurdity:
“For as we just said, all rules ‘infringe upon the freedom of the individual’. So what
P2 amounts to is the absurd proposition that all rules are unacceptable. Unless you
are a radical anarchist, you have to conclude that this argument is not deductively
sound.”
For a deconstructive reader, such rhetorical insistence is the proverbial “dead give
away”. The text has started to labour its point slightly, repeating the word “absurd” in
two consecutive sentences. It has also marginalised the issue that certain people might
believe P2. This momentary and at first unimportant descent into rhetoricity will be
followed up mercilessly by the deconstructive reader.
The word “absurd” serves a double purpose in the quoted passage. Firstly, it seems to
be an admission that P2 cannot be proven to be false; this admission is implied by the
fact that P2 is a prescriptive and not a descriptive statement. Secondly, the word adds
illocutionary force to statement that P2 is unacceptable. Illocutionary force is always
intended to achieve a perlocutionary effect (in this case derision) in the reader.
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Yet in trying to maintain the appearance of rational fairness, the text tells us exactly
who might believe this “absurd” statement: the “radical anarchist”. It is evidently not
impossible for such a person to exist. One could argue that anyone who believed P2
would contradict themselves: the prescription that “all rules are unacceptable” is itself
a rule; therefore it should not be believed by the radical anarchist; but this quibble is
easily avoided by adding the rider “except this one” to the rule P2, making it a
consistent and accurate reflection of an extreme anarchistic prescription.
However, as shown below, the text unwisely tries to obliterate the imperviousness to
logical argument that is inherent in the “radical anarchist” position (as in all
prescriptive statements); in doing so it falls prey to self-contradiction.
This does not happen immediately. The text does not evade the fact that argument
reconstruction has failed to prove whether the original argument is sound or not:
“Now there may be some less sweeping generalisation that the argument might
employ instead of P2, which would be more plausible, yet sufficient to obtain the
desired conclusion. But the arguer has not given any hint as to what generalisation
this might be. So we cannot credit the arguer with actually having supplied a helpful
argument on the issue. They may have something more plausible in mind, but they
have not conveyed it.”
The paragraph reveals a certain circularity concealed within the exercise being
conducted in this part of the text. The Principle of Charity is used to introduce an
assumption that the arguer did not state, and then used to criticise the speaker
implicitly for not producing a good argument. Evidently, the Principle of Charity has
its limits, even though earlier it was argued that if the truth of the matter is to be
pursued, one should become the arguer oneself. The paradox inherent in the Principle
of Charity is at work: how far do we go in reconstructing what a speaker may have
thought they said, and on what basis do we do so? If we stop at any point, and argue
that the speaker has not provided a good argument, how can we respond to a counter-
accusation that we stopped too early, took words out of context, are being wilfully
obtuse etc? In other words, an application, and failure, of the Principle of Charity is
open to the charge that it was a commission of what “Critical Thinking” calls “the
fallacy of begging the question”; that is, the surreptitious insertion of the desired
conclusion into the premises of an argument (p. 145). However, our text is not yet
self-contradictory in its dealings with this difficult issue.
The seeds of self-contradiction are sown in the next paragraph:
“This argument, by the way, is a good illustration of the importance of distinguishing
between argument and rhetoric. It was by thinking carefully about the precise literal
meanings of the words expressing the argument that we came to see the argument as
unsound.”
The text invites us to agree that the reconstructed argument is “unsound” (its premises
are not true). This statement is puzzling. The book’s definition of soundness is that a
sound argument has true premises (p. 60). Presumably then, an argument with
unverifiable premises cannot be determined as either sound or unsound; the text is
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silent on whether premises can be true or false irrespective of their verifiability. Note
the equivocation in the phrase “we came to see the argument as unsound”. After this
ambiguous phrase, the text starts to lose its coherence, increasing its own rhetorical
stakes in the course of a spirited denunciation of rhetoricity:
“In order to do this, however, we had to have some courage: a phrase such as ‘the
freedom of the individual’ is rhetorically powerful; nevertheless, it is just not literally
true that every rule that ‘infringes upon the freedom of the individual’ is
unacceptable; on the contrary, it is absurd to suggest it.”
When a text asserts a prescription, such as that P2 is “unacceptable”, a deconstructive
reader will ask: “To whom?” It is problematic to argue that P2 is “unacceptable”
immediately after identifying a party who might accept it (the radical anarchist). The
existence of a radical anarchist would indeed make P2 acceptable to someone, if not
many people. Recall the relevant statement:
“Unless you are some kind of radical anarchist, you have to conclude that this
argument is not deductively sound.”
We could interpret this as meaning that radical anarchists are a non-empty set of
individuals whose views should not be taken seriously. Clearly, since P2 is a
prescriptive statement, all that could ever be argued against it is an opposing
prescriptive statement; but instead the text advances a claim that P2 “is just not
literally true”. Notice that this phrase “(P2) is just not literally true” seems intended to
function as both argument and rhetoric: it asserts the falsity of P2 and at the same
time adds rhetorical force to the assertion that P2 is “unacceptable”. This phrase
disobeys the text’s critical distinction between literal truth and rhetoricity. Even a
statement that is “literally true” functions as a rhetorical device: one can always ask:
“Why that truth here and now, and not some other? Why not just silence?”
There are two possible reasons for concluding that P2 is “unacceptable”. The first, as
previously noted, is that P2 is self-contradictory: but this is easily corrected. The
second would be that very few people would accept P2. As it happens, this is the case.
Yet a reliance on majority belief would lead the text to contradict itself: it has already
argued that an argument from majority opinion is a logical fallacy (p. 116):
“This is the fallacy of concluding on the basis of the fact that the majority believe a
certain a certain proposition, that the proposition is true.”
In order to assert that P2 is false, the text can either assert an opposite statement
without proof, or make the appeal to majority belief that it has already labelled as a
fallacy. It seems to choose the latter course, implicating the reader in the majority
(radical anarchist or not) and thus contradicts one of its own principles.
The self-contradiction reveals the artificially constructed nature of the text,
undermining its claim to reveal truth. Deconstruction will find various indicators of
the precariousness of a text’s construction in the text itself: for example, we have
uncovered a dubious assumption that there is a clear distinction between literal
arguments and rhetoric, and a puzzling passage in which the text seems to make an
appeal to majority belief that it earlier claimed was a logical fallacy. “Critical
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Thinking”, like all texts, is designed to promote certain ends (i.e. it is prescriptive),
but in its very construction it transgresses those ends (i.e. contradicts itself). This is
the “double-bind” logic that deconstructive readings seek to uncover. Such encounters
with “aporia” raise interesting questions for debate, and suggest that an appearance of
literality, logicality, and rationality in a text should not necessarily be taken at face
value.
Let us attempt a diagnosis of why the quoted section of our text ends in apparent
contradiction with itself. We stated that an application of the Principle of Charity
might have “reconstructed” P2 as follows:
P2) No rule which infringes upon the freedom of the individual is acceptable except
this very rule.
Since this statement cannot be refuted logically, one might manage to convince a
“radical anarchist” that the principle is incompatible with other beliefs they espouse;
but one could never prove it false. A prescriptive principle can be “proved” false only
if it is self-contradictory and “proved” true only if it is a tautology (note that we have
to abuse the word “prove” even here, because the usual notion of a proof is foreign to
morality and ethics).
Of course, the text does not accuse the original arguer of being a radical anarchist, but
just a poor arguer. Nonetheless, the onset of the rhetorical attack on the absurdity of a
belief in P2 is an indicator of something amiss in a text that constantly inveighs
against the dangers of rhetoric. In our example, the consequent self-contradiction is
partly self-created, but also has more to do with meaning than with the logical form of
argumentation. The meaning of the definition of a “rule” assumed by the text is
questionable in itself:
“By definition, a rule of any kind restricts, hence infringes upon, the freedom of those
to whom it applies.”
This definition is not clear and correct, even though it might seem at first to
correspond to everyday ideas of how rules work. For example, one could argue that a
self-imposed rule does not restrict the freedom of the person it applies to in the sense
intended in the quoted passage. We could also argue that since one does not have to
obey rules, it is not the rule itself which infringes freedom, but its application. For
example, one is free to break rules in our society in the strict sense, since one cannot
be absolutely and perfectly prevented from doing so; but if one does break certain
rules, that freedom and many others may be removed. Again, we see the phenomenon
of a text running into difficult philosophical and ethical issues, without being able to
deal with them effectively, since these issues are, at first glance, outside the scope of
the subject that the text is treating; but as Derrida might quip, there is no “outside” of
the text. Deconstruction aims to find places in a text where attempts to exclude
complex considerations, particularly those of meaning and interpretation, lead to
apparent self-contradiction. The working hypothesis, derived from Derrida’s analysis
of the nature of binary oppositions (which are based on the idea of mutual exclusion)
is that exclusion necessarily leads to self-contradiction.
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To see why such a hypothesis might be worth consideration, we can theorise about
why the authors of “Critical Thinking” might not have been able to detect and make
reference to the issues raised here in their own text: this is puzzling, as any reader of
the book will find that its authors are stringent critics of argumentation. A
deconstructive thinker would propose that to reason about matters of indeterminacy of
meaning and interpretation, and to explicate the difficulties of logical undecidability,
as they are discussed here, would have undermined the ends that the authors had in
view for their text. Our reading has rendered those ends themselves less than clear,
casting doubt upon authorial authority, coherence, and control, as a deconstruction
sometimes does.
An important hypothesis of a deconstructive reading is that a text cannot maintain its
apparent coherence solely by means of rigorous logic. It must at some level rely on
techniques of exclusion and bias. Authorial fixation on certain goals (which
themselves may be deluded, imperfectly understood, or even contradictory) may
result in symptoms such as rhetorical flourishes and a condemnatory authorial tone.
These symptoms are taken as an indication of authorial anxiety about the possibility
of self-contradiction.
At such points, the text appears to be stating one thing and yet doing the opposite. The
resulting aporia is what a computer scientist might understand as a kind of interpretive
“deadlock”. Derrida views the phenomenon in Freudian terms. In “Of
Grammatology”, in the course of a discussion of Saussure’s irrational privileging of
speech over writing, he characterises the phenomenon thus:
“By a process exposed by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams, Saussure thus
accumulates contradictory arguments to bring about a satisfactory conclusion: the
exclusion of writing … To what zone of discourse does this strange functioning of
argumentation belong, this coherence of desire producing itself in a near-oneiric way
– although it clarifies the dream rather than allow itself to be clarified by it – through
a contradictory logic?”
This passage reveals a common theme of Derrida’s writing: the attempt to dismiss,
exclude, and render secondary considerations that might undermine the goals of a text
are interpreted as a kind of intellectual dreaming. The force of a strong desire
overcomes the absence of its desired object (truth) through the conjuring of an
argument that achieves an internal but illusory coherence. The illusion can only be
maintained through the subconscious repression of both its own lack of foundation in
reality and a repression of the artifice of its foundation upon contradictory exclusions.
Be that as it may, it does seem that the troubled rhetoric-against-rhetoric in “Critical
Thinking” arises from the operation of prescriptive principles of which the authors
may not have been fully aware at the time of writing. For example, an approach to
settling arguments for or against a course of action on the basis of deductive
soundness (truth of premises) or inductive force is not applicable to arguments based
on prescriptive premises. Given a sufficiently generous Principle of Charity,
deductive validity can often (perhaps always) be achieved on both sides of such an
argument. It might be that the argument on one side of the debate could be shown to
rest on contradictory prescriptive premises; but even then, adjudicators could find
themselves troubled by another widespread prescriptive principle: namely that one
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should respect the beliefs of others even if they do seem contradictory. Where an
argument contains contradictory prescriptive premises (such as our “uncharitable”
interpretation of P2 as a self-contradiction), or the other party simply refuses to lay
out their position, one may have no other choice but to resort to force to settle the
argument de facto: that is to impose a decision by non-argumentative means. We can
only hope that we never have to settle an argument between a surrealist and a nihilist.
“Critical Thinking” does attempt to deal with limitations in its approach in Chapter 6,
“Issues in Argument Assessment”. It also proposes a strategy of pointing out self-
contradictions as a defence against – or perhaps attack on - relativism (p. 246).
However, in half-addressing and half-balking at the nature of its own limits, the text
again falls prey to rhetoricity and implicit self-contradiction in this chapter. It again
becomes unclear whether the text bases its claim to significance on an a priori
assertion, or upon logical fallacies that it has earlier condemned. The passage is
worthy of closer examination, because it illustrates Derrida’s contention that certain
self-contradictions in texts are somehow systematic and inescapable (even necessary),
if we agree that verbal meaning cannot be finally fixed and rendered unarguable, or in
Derrida’s phrase, made “fully present”. Derrida usually tries to point out self
contradictions that are not simply the result of authorial errors, but inevitable given
the goals of the text.
Admitting that it is not always possible to tell whether a deductively valid argument is
also sound, and that it is possible for an inductively forceful argument to be defeated
by new evidence, Chapter 6 of “Critical Thinking” introduces the concept of rational
persuasiveness. This concept is defined as follows (p. 209):
“To say that an argument is rationally persuasive for a person is to say:
(i) the argument is either deductively valid or inductively forceful;
(ii) the person reasonably believes the argument’s premises; and
(iii) it is not an inductively forceful argument that is defeated for that person.”
The text attempts to define rational persuasiveness as independent of a subjective
viewpoint; that is, we may mistakenly view an argument as rationally persuasive even
when it should not be, due to our mistaken interpretation (p. 212):
“Whether or not an argument is rationally persuasive for you does not depend upon
whether or not you think it is. The crux of the matter is to understand this: an
argument may be rationally persuasive for you even though you are not persuaded by
it. This should not be regarded as paradoxical. All it means is that there are cases
where you ought to be persuaded by an argument, but you are not. Likewise there are
cases where you are persuaded or convinced by an argument, but where you should
not be, because the argument is not actually rationally persuasive for you. It is the
task of rhetoric to cause people to overestimate the rational persuasiveness of an
argument – to convince or persuade people without giving them good reasons …
… If rational persuasiveness were defined so as to make all rationally persuasive
arguments ones that actually persuaded people, we would have no way of accounting
for the fact that sometimes people fail to be persuaded by arguments that they really
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should be persuaded by, and are sometimes persuaded by arguments that they should
not be persuaded by.”
There are several points to note about this passage:
a) The remorseless repetition of prescriptive verbs (“should” and “ought”).
b) The insistence that the concept of rational persuasiveness “should not be
regarded as paradoxical”, which implies that it has been or might be.
c) The puzzling notion that an argument can be rationally persuasive “for us”
without our knowing it. The text seems unable to admit directly that
misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and indeed limited self-understanding,
must play a role in the process whereby people fail to be persuaded by
arguments that they “should” find rationally persuasive.
d) The puzzling connection between the ideas of rational persuasiveness and the
Principle of Charity.
One could well argue that the idea of rational persuasiveness is inherently
paradoxical. It defines an absolute of persuasiveness and yet it does not always
persuade us. We can fail to recognise it, believing that an argument is rationally
persuasive “for us” when it “should not be”, and think we have found it when we have
not. Yet throughout “Critical Thinking” it has been argued that it is possible to infer
the intentions of an arguer using evidence that goes beyond what they have actually
stated: but if our grasp of what is “meant” by an argument is precarious, the entire
basis of rational argument is precarious to at least the same degree. This could explain
why we could fail to mis-identify rational persuasiveness.
Consider that if we cannot be sure of our own grasp of the meaning of an argument,
even when we have reconstructed it and can repeat it to ourselves in the privacy of our
own minds, it follows that we cannot ever know that we have truly grasped the
intentions of the arguer. Furthermore, it is presumably possible for us to be mistaken
about the arguments that we originate (construct) in our own minds. If the unfortunate
possibilities of failure to grasp meaning are inherent in the minds of both arguer and
listener, rational argument requires some external criteria to finally decide whether
both parties should have “truly” reached agreement. Perhaps the reality of subsequent
events could intervene to “settle” the argument (i.e. convince the parties that either
their agreement was fallacious, or that one of them was wrong); but logic and
rationality can provide no way out of the impasse of an uncertain grasp of meaning. It
is the notion that we have an inherently insecure grasp of meaning, or rather the idea
that meaning is inherently ungraspable, that deconstruction uses to destabilise texts.
In the passage just quoted, “Critical Thinking” comes very near to grappling with
points c) and d), but does not articulate the problem of uncertainties of meaning. It
could be said to embroil the reader in those very problems. If the meanings of
premises and conclusions can indeed be misunderstood on both sides of an argument,
as argued earlier, then perhaps it is happening as we read from “Critical Thinking”,
and happening again as you read this. What external force could decide for us?
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In any case, the quoted passage seems paradoxical in the much the same way as the
previous ones in our discussion. Although the ideal of “Critical Thinking” is that
people ought only to be persuaded by rational arguments, the text can give no
rationally persuasive argument that shows that they should be persuaded solely by
rationally persuasive arguments. As before, the ideal either has to be accepted non-
rationally or justified using logical fallacies. For example, the fallacy “ought from is”
could be used to justify the ideal (people are persuaded by rational arguments,
therefore they ought to be); or the fallacy of majority belief could be used as it
previously seemed to be (most people think they should be persuaded only by
rationally persuasive arguments, therefore it is true).
It is perhaps not surprising that the text cannot find a rational argument to prove that
rational argument ought to be more persuasive than non-rational argument. The
superiority of rational argument over rhetoric may well lie beyond logical reasoning.
Firstly, its superior effectiveness could be based on inductively forceful but
fundamentally empirical practical reasoning i.e. in practice rationally persuasive
arguments seem to lead to true conclusions more often than non-rational arguments);
secondly, it could be an a priori principle of human thinking (though the text itself
states that humans are often irrational); thirdly, the “effectiveness” may be a socially
constructed concept with no other basis in reality. However, if we are in sysmpathy
with the author’s goals, the first of these viewpoints is the most interesting. Suppose
that the opposition between rational logic and rhetoric is the root of the difficulty.
Having disposed of it, logic takes its place as a most effective form of rhetoric. Not
only does it have great potential to persuade, but in practice it leads to true
conclusions more often than rhetoric without logic. However, attempts to establish
rational logic as an undeniable and self-justifying prescription seem doomed to the
commission of the very logical fallacies and rhetoricity that it aims to expel from
inside itself. The difficulty in our text arises from imagining that the distinction
between logic and rhetoric is strict, not from any ineffectiveness of logic as such.
The “anxiety” evidenced when our text approaches such questions is usually indicated
by a rise in the rhetoricity of the prose (“the crux of the matter is…”; “this should not
be regarded as paradoxical.”; “they really should be persuaded by …”). Rhetoric often
indicates an uncomfortable awareness of certain limits inherent in the artificially
constructed nature of a text. Such limits become apparent (or at least possible) when
issues that would undermine the claims to significance, reality, and truth being
advanced seem liable to spill over into the discussion. The text cannot let this happen:
either it falls into what Derrida calls a “productive silence” or the tone becomes
hectoring and confused. In this case at least, the problems seem to be self-created.
However, deconstructive thinkers go further, arguing that escape from the
deconstructive trap is fundamentally impossible, they would be inclined to be
charitable to the authors of “Critical Thinking”, especially when they admit the
following (p. 214):
“We cannot always know with certainty whether an argument is sound, but that is the
human predicament.”
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If the authors cannot know that the argument of their book is “sound” according to
their own definition of the word (p. 270), because their own understanding of it is not
verifiably total, then neither can its readers.
The problematic passages in “Critical Thinking” show that problems of meaning and
interpretation undermine the possibility of logical argument construction and
reconstruction in principle and practice. Logical argument depends upon the
determinacy of meaning for its verification of truth because premises of uncertain
meaning cannot be assessed for their logical truth. The impossibility of finally fixing
and controlling meaning, if factual (whether the question of factuality can itself be
understood is a central theme of Derrida’s thinking), would be more fundamental to
communication than logical form. One could succeed in making an incontrovertible
judgement only if the premises and conclusions had a fixed meaning accepted by all
parties, verifiable by all parties, and intended by them (whatever this may mean) in
their utterances; but notice that in the absence of what Derrida calls a “transcendental
signified” which “grounds” the field of meaning, such meanings could only ever be
socially constructed and fragile (the “fallacy” of majority belief might be the best
basis).
Chapter 7 of the “Critical Thinking” on “Truth, Knowledge and Belief” expresses the
absolutist idealism of the book. It contains an ineffective attack on relativism.
Ironically, at that very point, socially constructed meanings undermine the very
attempt to defend the notion of objective truth. The text argues that the sentence “La
Paz is the capital of Bolivia.” is factual, and that its truth-value is not “implicitly
speaker relative”; but this is falsified by the observation that the only “speakers” we
know of are human beings. Both the formal borders of a country and the concept of a
“capital city” are social constructions: patterns projected upon the objective physical
world by humanity; in fact they could be viewed as rhetorical constructs. There are
many historical precedents showing that national borders and capital status can be
subjects of dispute, do not really exist, and can be dismissed or forgotten.
Furthermore, the notion that neither concept has any objective reality does not imply
the relativism that the book is attempting to debunk. Perhaps the difficulty of arriving
at fixed verbal meanings, coupled with misinterpretations of their respective
intentions, rarely made transparent through words, can account for the passion in the
debate between relativists and rationalists; and perhaps it can explain why the debate
seems so frustrating and fruitless to others.
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